3.3.4 Many of the existing buildings do not have proper windows or doors. Where doors exist, they are often made from salvaged ammunition boxes or other scraps of timber. There is also a great shortage of glass for window panes. Plastic sheeting is commonly used instead. Glass may not be an essential commodity for the present, but when peace returns, sheet glass will have to be brought in along with other construction materials such as cement, doors, roofing materials, window frames and basic tools for construction.

3.3.5 As it takes time to construct any sort of building --- whether concrete or katcha --- it is essential that returnees be provided shelter, probably in tents, while they undertake the work. The Shura said that needs might be modest because when the tents had been used by one family while building their home, they would be passed on to the next family.

3.3.6 Given the above situation, the Mission recommends the following:-

a) Stockpiling of a sufficient number of tents in the district headquarters of Kunar Province to cater for an eventual return of refugees to the area

b) Work out an implementing agreement with the present Shura on how the distribution of tents should be carried.

c) Tents provided to refugees who return to their respective villages should be on a loan basis which should be retrieved from them for further use.

d) The provision of steel girders in place of wooden beams should be considered to protect further destruction of existing forests.

e) A certain number of basic construction tools such as picks, hammers, shovels, buckets and wheel barrows should be made available for returning refugees intending to rebuild their homes, on a loan basis.

Shelter and Housing (Long Term)

3.3.7 The major town in the valley, Chaghasarai, had some 42,000 people before the war. Those presently living in the town are mostly from elsewhere. How many of the former residents will return is a moot point since some sympathised with the regimes since 1979 and have fled to Kabul (they are unlikely to be welcomed back); and some of the refugees in Pakistan and elsewhere may have established themselves so well in their adopted homes that they will be loathe to return to a war torn homeland. This will, of course, affect the amount of reconstruction material required for shelter and housing. Those who will return from the refugee areas are thought likely to bring as much construction material as they are able, since they are well aware of the lack of availability of building materials.

3.3.8 Some 30% of the refugees in Pakistan are housed on private land; and such areas were set up on the express understanding that houses once built, would not be demolished when the refugees return. Assuming that the returnees honour this understanding, they will be in need of materials upon their return. However, the rate of return is likely to be self regulating. Not only will people be dependent on motor transport; but the present estimates of three families to a 5-tonne truck seems to be overly optimistic, given that building materials are most likely to be transported. This implies that considerably more trips will be required of the truckers, slowing down the process. With this possible mechanism will come another factor which is likely further to slow the process. Assuming that families know that building materials are in short supply, they may delay their return. Regulating the supply of building materials may prove to be a means of slowing down or speeding up the the return of refugees.

3.3.9 Materials required long term will include tools, roofing timbers, wood for doors, windows and frames, cement, and some wire. No estimate of quantities is possible as a result of this mission.

3.4 Food Needs

3.4.1 The present population's food requirements are met by importing commodities from Pakistan. With the exception of a few shops in Chaghasarai bazaar, and a very few others on the comparatively well used road from Chaghasarai to Nengelam road, no commercial activities exist in Kunar Province. Land use is dealt with elsewhere in this report, but it is noted that wheat planted in the Pech valley and on the south of Chaghasarai will only be harvested in June/July, 1989. No land cultivation is taking place from Nowabad to Nurgal; nor from Chaghasarai to Asmar. No food production therefore can be expected from these areas during 1989.

3.4.2 Food aid for a period of 12 - 18 months is indicated as absolutely essential for returning refugees and the possibility of pre-positioning of food stocks in Kunar Province was welcomed by the authorities met by the Mission. The authorities have also indicated that they see the need to continue to provide food aid to refugees once they return to Afghanistan up to the time that they will be able to achieve full self sufficiency.

3.4.3 Accordingly, since some refugees are already returning to Kunar, it is recommended that rehabilitation of the storage facility in Chaghasarai should immediately be followed by the pre-positioning of 400 tonnes of food and that the methods of distribution be discussed with the authorities.

3.4.4 Obtaining prevailing food prices was virtually impossible. Thus the following prices should only be regarded as indicative:-

Wheat,	1 seer (7kg)	230 Afghanis
Tea,	1 kg	1,200 Afghanis
Lentils,	1 kg	100 Afghanis
Sugar,	1 kg	200 Afghanis
Edible oil,	2¼ litres	700 Afghanis
Chicken,	1 live fowl	800 - 1,000 Afghanis

(US $ 1.00 = ± 180 Afghanis)

3.4.5 Recommendations

a) 400 tons of food stocks should be pre-positioned in the Chaghasarai store as soon as this is ready to recieve it

b) The eventual appointment of an international officer in Chaghasarai should be considered. At an early stage of the operation, this officer could act on behalf of the whole UN System and could prepare the establishment of facilities and the work of other missions to the Province.

3.5 Food Storage Facilities

3.5.1 The Mission was able to identify storage facilities in Chaghasarai. These include a former food store of approximately 500 - 600 tonnes capacity; office space; a fuel pump; a courtyard of limited extent; an empty site adjacent to the store that after being fenced could be used for erecting temporary storage in the open for certain goods. Works to be undertaken to rehabilitate these premises include the repair of the roof; construction of a stone wall on the front side of the yard to complete its fencing; the provision of two gates; the rehabilitation of office space; provision of toilets and rehabilitation of the fuel station. Funds should be made immediately available for the rehabilitation of the storage facilities.

3.5.2 The Mission did not have the time to identify a potential site to be used as a support centre/operational base for the UN. It is suggested that while utilising the storage facilities in Chaghasarai, investigations should be made to identify a suitable site for support centres in both Chowki (where apparently large stores exist and in Sarkhaneh. Any storage requirements in Nengelam village will have to be built because the village (once the main administrative centre for the Pech Valley) has been totally destroyed.

3.5.3 No information is available about storage facilities in Asmar and other main centres of the Province that could not be visited by the Mission.

3.5.4 Recommendation

The UN should rehabilitate the storage facilities and the petrol station in Chaghasarai. Simultaneously, other potential sites (in areas not visited by the mission) for storage and a site for a UN Suppport Centre' for operations should be explored.

3.6 The Land:

This section deals with all matters related to productive use of the land; agriculture, irrigation, livestock and forestry. A brief overview is given, followed by a more detailed and specific report.

3.6.1 It is useful to consider the situation prior to the outbreak of hostilities. At that time, of the predominantly agricultural population of approximately 300,000 in the province, it was said, "Present agriculture cannot cope with the high population densities in the (Kunar) basin unless irrigation facilities are increased." Prior to 1979 it was estimated that 26,500 hectares were under cultivation of which 16,000 hectares were irrigated. Irrigation systems were traditional.

Simple weirs of brushwood and stone diverted water from the rivers into simple earth channels which led the water to cultivated fields on the alluvial river terraces.

Prior to 1979, projects were on the "drawing board" to improve and increase irrigated agricultural production in the valley; but they were never put into operation. These should be reviewed and revived as soon as possible.

3.6.2 The situation as it obtains today is very different. The agricultural population have left the Kunar valley and its main tributaries. Only an occasional family is to be observed "hanging on", or recently returned. The men who do return generally do so as Mujahedeen and not normally as farmers, though there are clearly exceptions.

For the most part, the agricultural land in the valley and its subsidiaries has remained uncultivated for the past eight years. Only in the immediate vicinity of Chaghasarai (formerly Asadabad, renamed some ten years ago) has land remained in continuous agricultural production because until October, 1988, it was still under Government control.

The most impressive observation was the speed and will with which the land in certain places --- in particular the Pech valley --- is now being brought back into cultivation with no outside assistance and the minimum of equipment and draught power.

3.6.3 The Mission was able to observe at first hand the land from the top of the Nawa Pass to Sarkhaneh in the valley itself; from Sarkhaneh to Chaghasarai; from Chaghasarai for 20 kms up the Kunar river towards Asmar; and from Chaghasarai up the Pech valley for 40 kms to where the valley divides at the now destroyed district centre of Nengelam. Most of the latter was observed on foot.

Time and transport did not permit a first hand observation of the valley downstream of Sarkhaneh to Chowki, Nurgal and Khas Kunar. This is said to be the area of greatest agricultural potential, and is where the valley is at its flattest and widest.

3.6.4 The following is a brief description of each of the five parts of the valley from personal observations and, in the case of Chowki and Nurgal (etc), from reports.

<u>From the top of the Nawa Pass to Sarkhaneh</u> villages are all damaged or destroyed. Rainfed terraces are virtually all out of cultivation. It must have been extremely poor subsistence farming here at the best of times, scratching a living from the rocky soil. Presently, signs of life are beginning to return. There is virtually no livestock apart from occasional small flocks (10 - 20) of goats.

<u>From Sarkhaneh to Chowki (down the main Kunar valley)</u> is said to have been the most --- actually --- and potentially productive part of the valley. This area was not visited by the Mission. Reports indicate that it is presently totally abandoned with no fields either irrigated or rainfed cultivated for the last eight years. It is variously described as either becoming a desert or a jungle of bushes and trees depending on the location. In many places, mines have been laid in agricultural land along the main road between Jalalabad and Chaghasarai. By all accounts, mechanised farming would be quite relevant once the problem of mines can be solved.

<u>From Sarkhaneh to the Nurgal Bridge over the Kunar river</u> land is now totally abandoned and resembles a desert. Neither irrigated nor rainfed fields have been cultivated for seven or eight years. The main irrigation channels are dry and damaged and lined with dead trees. Mines have been laid in the land along the road and around military positions. The country has been quite torn up in places and will require some levelling.

<u>From the Nurgal bridge upstream to Chaghasarai</u> (including the immediate environs of Chaghasarai itself and 5 kms up the Pech valley to the Salar canal intake) most of the land has been in continuous cultivation throughout the war and the Salar canal remains much as it was described prior to 1979. The main crops being grown are wheat, maize, rice, and sugar cane with occasional patches of vegetables (turnips, onions, white radishes and cabbages were seen), walled orchards of citrus --- sweet and bitter oranges --- and red mulberries mainly planted along the water channels. The main amenity trees are eucalyptus which provides some indication of the mild winters experienced here. It would appear that some of the families who were cultivating this land may have gone with the retreating government forces to Jalalabad.

At Salarbagh near Chaghasarai, there is a 20 hectare government farm and nursery. It is neglected, but it could, with little difficulty, be made productive. There is some evidence of desultory work having continued in producing small trees, citrus, eucalyptus, cypress etc. (it has even been said that a trial with tea bushes was run).

<u>From Chaghasarai to Asmar</u> (Kunar valley above Chaghasarai) was observed for some 20 km above Chaghasarai by the Mission, and the remaining part of the valley up to Asmar itself is said to be much the same. After the first two or three kilometres upstream of Chaghasarai, agriculture ceases and no land has been cultivated during the past eight years. Villages are destroyed or badly damaged. All are abandoned. The terraced fields, both irrigated and rainfed are totally neglected and invaded by grasses and artemesia. No irrigation channels are working. There was little or no evidence of livestock of any kind and the rocky mountain slopes did not appear to have been under grazing pressure for several years. The Mission was informed that higher up the valley, the mountains were being grazed by the flocks of the semi-nomadic Gujar who are not Pushtoon.

<u>From Chaghasarai up the Pech valley to Nengelam</u> which is some 40 km in length, has, from 1979 until this year, remained agriculturally abandoned. Only for a few kilometres upstream of the Salar canal intake has continuous cultivation taken place, with wheat, maize, rice and sugar cane being grown together with citrus and mulberries. However, it is in the Pech valley above this point that the Mission was able to witness the most remarkable effort that is being made to restore the valley to agricultural normality, even before the villages are reconstructed and the population returns.

Land along the Pech river is mainly irrigated from water channelled from the river onto alluvial terraces by means of rough weirs of stones and brushwood which have to be restored several times a year. Prior to hostilities there were said to have been approximately 40 such weirs between Chaghasarai and Nengelam where the valley divides. The Mission observed 18 now restored and in use; and may have missed others. This would coincide with the estimate of the local commander that between 40% and 50% of the irrigable land in the valley has been brought back into cultivation this year. Most of this has been in the last two months since the fall of Chaghasarai. Until this summer, the valley had not been cultivated for the previous seven years. There is evidence that a crop of maize was harvested from fields close by some villages and the stalks were stacked in the branches of trees. Maize cobs were being fed to the donkey trains going up and down the valley.

3.6.5 In addition to this, and of great significance was the enormous effort that has been put into the planting of a crop of wheat this autumn. The wheat planting season ends about now in the Pech valley. Some wheat was already germinated and the fields green; others were newly planted and some ploughing was still going on in places, in fields grown over with a thick mat of grass.

This effort has been achieved in different ways. Some men have returned from Pakistan to plant their fields before returning to their families or to the war. Also, villagers from communities higher up in the mountains that have survived the worst of the damage, have been encouraged to cultivate and plant the land for an eventual share of the crop next harvest time. There is a shortage of draught animals though some were to be seen either working or grazing; but somehow this has been achieved by corporate effort and the sharing of equipment and animals. It must be understood that apart from very occasional families, the valley is still almost entirely devoid of resident human life.

The wheat seed has been obtained from a variety of sources.

a) From seed (of mixed origin and quality) purchased in Afghanistan --- mainly from villages with some surplus outside the area;

b) From seed (of mixed origin and quality) purchased from Pakistani farmers, mainly in Bajaur Agency where most of the Kunar refugees are located; and

c) From wheat taken from government forces godowns after the fall of Chaghasarai. This is almost certainly food wheat of unknown origin.

Apart from the occasional small herd of cows and bullocks and the very occasional small flock of sheep and goats, there are few animals in that part of the valley visited. Poultry are seen as an important and portable form of meat and many of the groups of travellers going up and down the valley with their donkeys carried a chicken or two with them. The Mission itself emulated this example at one stage, eating the chickens for lunch.

3.6.6 Neglect is probably the main cause of irrigation structures --- weirs and channels --- going out of use. The rapidity with which they have managed to restore as much as they have gives some indication of what can be done with the very limited manpower at present at their disposal. In fact, many fields have been planted in anticipation of the channels and weirs being repaired and may effectively end up by being rainfed this season.

3.6.7 It would be unwise to extrapolate too much from the example of what is happening agriculturally in the Pech valley, but it does give an insight of what can be achieved by the people of Afghanistan in restoring their country with limited means, and in setting their priorities; i.e. in first replanting their fields before even restoring their houses and bringing their families back. In this case, however, it has to be recognised that the refugee families from Kunar are mainly only one mountain range away in Bajaur Agency of Pakistan.

3.6.8 <u>Agricultural Needs and Recommendations</u>

a) <u>Seeds</u> of the following varieties are required before May, 1989:

Wheat, maize and barley for all areas.

Rice, sugar cane and small citrus trees for Chaghasarai

Vegetable seeds (turnips, cabbages and cabbage) for all areas.

It is believed that all seeds may be obtained in Pakistan.

As far as the wheat varieties are concerned, the parts of the valley visited by the Mission do not suffer severe or lengthy frosts, though this may not apply at the higher ends of the valley above Asmar and above Nengelam.

The land around Chaghasarai is already under cultivation and good seed can be accepted immediately. This also applies to the Pech valley where improved wheat and maize seed can be immediately put to good use next planting season. Were it possible to get some wheat seed to Chaghasarai before the end of December, 1988, there is little doubt that it would be planted.

b) Fertilizer. None is at present being used in the valley. Urea could be used to top-dress the wheat crop in Chaghasarai and Pech next spring, and both places could make immediate use of both phosphate and nitrogen fertilizer next planting season for all the crops mentioned. Access via the Nawa Pass should not be difficult by early 1989.

As far as the land still uncultivated up the Asmar road and downstream of the Nawabad bridge are concerned, the Shura should advise the UN of when people start to return to cultivate their land, so that inputs of seed and fertilizer can be provided. Distribution will, for the moment, be by the Shura.

c) Tools and Implements. These will be needed such as picks, shovels, spades to enable the manpower once released from the war quickly to restore traditional irrigation systems to their previous level of efficiency.

d) Draught Power will be required. A small number of tractors with implements are needed, particularly for the areas now growing bushes in the lower part of the valley.

It must be understood that at present there is no fuel, nor is there a capacity to maintain mechanical equipment for lack of tools. Thus any mechanical equipment must be accompanied by both fuel and tools, both of which should fall under the control of the Shura. Prior to the war, contract ploughing by contractors from Jalalabad was known.

The Mission was told of the need for draught oxen. In the Pech valley the Mission was told that given the money, the population could obtain the animals in Pakistan and bring them to the valley.

e) Livestock: Apart from assistance to purchase draught oxen and cows, it is not believed a priority to assist returning refugees to purchase sheep and goats. They will bring back whatever they have been able to obtain in Pakistan. The hills have not suffered from the rest they have had these past years and flocks will soon build up of their own accord.

Assistance with obtaining a basic stock of poultry should however be considered as being a productive source of easily transportable protein.

Veterinary assistance should follow --- but as things stand at the present moment, the part of the valley visited by the Mission is almost as devoid of domestic animals as it is of resident human beings. That is, of course, with the exception of transport animals. This will remain for some time until roads have been opened up; and even then, such animals will still be required for the remoter valleys.

1 OVERVIEW

Kunar Province does not yet give the impression of peace and security. Soviet and Kabul forces left barely two months before the UN Mission arrived. Aeroplanes bombed Chaghasarai (Asadabad), the Provincial capital, at the end of November. People in Kunar assume that the bombers could return at any moment. The hillsides are bristling in readiness.

The dull thud of artillery bombardment over Jalalabad regularly fills the air, a reminder of the continuing conflict. At night it is visible, red and orange, in the sky to the south west.

There are few women and children. The sick and wounded have mostly been moved to Pakistan. The able-bodied staying behind know that their families are safe across the border. Tribal and political sympathies have led others to flee for Kabul or different provinces.

In this atmosphere, concern for and questions about the relief and rehabilitation needs of the Province were sometimes met with no more than politeness. The highest priority is peace. The Mission's most important result may have been to stimulate thought as to likely requirements when peace returns, the degree to which they can be prepared for now, and how they can be arranged.

The humanitarian needs are enormous and the damage and neglect profound. Many of the questions the Mission had anticipated asking - about health, education, trade, the economy - proved to be totally irrelevant upon arrival.

In some districts visited, over 90% of the population has gone, the fields are abandoned and the buildings have been destroyed or are roofless. There are no functioning schools or health services. Wrecked military vehicles far outnumber servicable trucks and pick-ups. Many roads are either impassable because of mines, destroyed bridges or potholes, or all three.

The lack of time, transport, usable roads and fuel combined to restrict the area the Mission could cover. Participants walked up to 100 kms during the 100 hour visit. This allowed the Mission to see more detail, meet more Afghans and appreciate the great logistical problems involved. At no time did any member feel in any personal danger. Hospitality, humour and friendliness everywhere made as profound an impression as the physical destruction. The morale of the population is extremely high.

f) <u>Irrigation</u> needs should be viewed from both the near and longer term perspectives. Immediately, irrigation systems should be restored to what they were in about 1978; and for this only simple tools will be required together with community effort. In the longer term, plans which were in hand for increasing the irrigable area should be reviewed and implemented if found still applicable. The Mission believes that they are essentially correct, but propose that an expert be allowed to visit the Kunar valley for one week to confirm this fact.

g) <u>Forestry</u>: From verbal reports given to the Mission, Diwagal forest has been somewhat affected during the conflict, but particularly in the area near the border with Pakistan. Some areas have been burned, while others have suffered uncontrolled felling. It is recommended that a survey be undertaken of the actual status of the forest at some later stage; and, more particularly, measures should be taken to bring the forest area under control. Woodlands and forests are precious resources.

3 7 <u>Health</u>:

3.7.1 A preliminary assessment of the present health status of the population of Kunar Province indicates that it is generally fair. This may come as a surprise to many who have been following the events in Afghanistan. The main reason for this finding was that sometime during the height of the fighting, there was a massive displacement of the population, the majority of which left the country, while some went to neighbouring provinces. In 1981, official statistics indicated that Kunar Province had a population of some 262,000 (these data may be open to question); while today, there may only be 15% of that number still in the Province. There is presently a skewed sex and age distribution. About 90% of the present population is made up of young to middle age males. The remaining 10% is made up of women, children and older people who are either nomadic (Gujars) or who travel cross border to work their lands. There are very few resident families left. The Mission was informed that the injured and maimed either withdraw to the hills, or go as refugees to other areas. Thus, it was likely that those seen were fit and healthy.

3.7.2 <u>Health Services</u>: Mass migration of the population resulted in the disruption of all health and health-related services in the Province and, to date, services are non-existent. Self medication, especially amongst the Mujahedeen, is the norm. Medical consultations, hospitalisation and recovery can only take place in Pakistan where health services are provided to the refugees. Availability of drugs in the bazaars of Kunar is minimal; and assistance from Pakistan based organisations is unknown according to those in areas visited

3.7.3 Health Manpower: There appears to be no health manpower of any description in the areas visited by the Mission. They are thought either to be in refugee camps in Pakistan or to have resettled in other countries.

Health Infrastructure is dealt with under "Infrastructure", elsewhere in this report.

3.7.4 Specific Health Problems were sought during the Mission. As women and children were generally absent, and as only the able bodied were left, this exercise appeared less relevant. Besides, such questions were generally met with very polite but slightly mystified disbelief; for in a situation where death is not only a possibility but rather a probability, does it matter whether one is sick when one is killed ? Nevertheless, it seemed reasonable to suppose that, being so close to an area which is said to boast the highest rates of I.D.D. in the world, there might be evidence of goitres in Kunar. A number of people confirmed that there had been some that they remembered --- surprisingly, in the Pech valley rather than where one might expect them, north of Asmar. Accordingly, a careful watch was made in the upper Pech valley either for goitres, or for cretins. No evidence of either was found. Either the displacement has led to a different diet which can ameliorate IDD; or people suffering from IDD have been removed to the refugee camps or the hills.

3.7.5 Recommendations for the Future: It should be noted that while the present population of Kunar Province do not perceive health as being a high priority at the present --- a view with which the Mission generally concurs at this time --- nevertheless, when the refugees start returning, there will naturally be a change in this attitude. There is also the possibility during the move back that epidemics of different types may be encountered, particularly where there will be food deficits. Accordingly, the following recommendations should be viewed with this in mind.

a) During the move back to Afghanistan, WHO, UNHCR and UNICEF should monitor health conditions. This should probably involve a capability for WHO to identify the cause of a suspected epidemic by using mobile epidemiological staff with a base in Peshawar. The NGO coordinating committees (ACBAR and SWABAC) with their members should also advise the UN of changes in health status so that timely actions may be taken.

b) Health Manpower at all levels should be identified in the recipient communities; in the camps; and, if possible, at other locations outside the area (those settled elsewhere). To this end, the office of the Reconstruction Authority for Afghanistan; NGOs (with ACBAR and SWABAC); and PD(H)ARHP may prove useful resources. Additionally, both UNHCR and UNICEF are known to be attempting an inventory of certain categories of

health manpower. The identification should then be followed by encouraging those identified to make themselves and their skills known to the authorities in the area of their return; or, in the case of those who are resident outside the area, encouraging them to return to make a contribution to the reconstruction process.

c) Existing training institutions in Pakistan should be fully exploited to train as many refugees as possible prior to their return. Some concern is expressed by the Mission about the quality and curriculum for such training, and mention must be made of the standardised curricula being prepared by UNHCR for peripheral health workers. Perhaps funding of NGO executed training programmes in this subject should be contingent upon the use of the standardised curricula.

d) As soon as peace is restored, the referral hospital in Chaghasarai should be brought into operation. For this, it will be necessary for a suitable consultant(s) to be employed to detail all the works necessary, the equipment required, and training needs. The same consultant(s) can then be used to develop plans for the Basic Health Units (BHUs) which will become necessary, together with associated logistic support.

e) As there are large numbers of people from Kunar who have been disabled because of the hostilities, a start should be made to identify organisations willing to work in this difficult area. One or more of those organisations should be recruited to undertake surveys of the magnitude of the problem together with recommendations for possible solutions. Disabilities will include widowhood, maiming or amputation, and mental trauma or shell shock. Such a survey may also take into account those disabled from IDD if any there be.

3 8 Education:

3.8.1 The Mission met no-one who described himself as a teacher. Education was not perceived by those met as being a priority problem. Not only will Islamic early education be available from the Madrasahs, but it is believed that sufficient teachers from the refugee camps will return to the area to make education feasible. This may be somewhat optimistic. While it is possible to contemplate that an informal system of gaining literacy may develop, at the same time further education will be a very great problem. The educated section of the population has certainly been much reduced.

3.8.2 Mention should be made of the Shahid (Martyrs) buried on the north side of the bridge over the Pech river in Chaghasarai. The Mission was informed that during the Taraki regime, some 1,200 people of Chaghasarai --- all with skills --- were invited to a large meeting at this point on some pretext, and were then machine gunned and buried in a mass grave with a bulldozer. This will inevitably affect education in the Province, since teachers will have been included. As considerable numbers of educated Afghans fled Kunar, some to Kabul, some abroad, many of whom may never return, then it is clear that much needs to be done to restore the situation to what it was before the war. Chaghasarai may prove not to be an appropriate venue for a teacher training facility. Jalalabad may be better because of the numbers of teachers who will be needed.

3.8.3 UNICEF and UNHCR are presently involved in obtaining an inventory of skills available in the refugee camps in Pakistan. The findings of that work should be matched with the individual Salam Mission Reports before any conclusions about the magnitude of the task in restoring the education system to its former condition are drawn. The UNICEF/UNHCR report concentrates on education.

3.9 Widows, Orphans and the Disabled:

3.9.1 Surveys undertaken in refugee camps confirm that numbers of widows and orphans are considerable. The Mission was unable to obtain reliable data about the numbers still in the valley. Indeed, very few women and children were seen at all, and those that were may come from the Gujar group which is nomadic.

Discussions with local people and the Afghan members of the team indicated that this problem will be addressed in a traditional manner. It is likely that a future government will advise able bodied men to take second, third and even fourth wives so that the widows and orphans will be cared for. It was pointed out more than once that the Holy Quran makes a provision for taking more than one wife for exactly this reason. The domestic upheaval that this will entail is not considered to be extraordinary.

3.9.2 Just one amputee was seen during the visit. The disabled had withdrawn to the mountains or to Pakistan, and no data were available concerning their numbers. The Mission was informed that there are many. They will require care and rehabilitation when peace comes.

The activities in this field of ICRC (The International Committee of the Red Cross), the Lady Reading Hospital in Peshawar, and HI (Handicap International) in Quetta with respect to prosthesis are well known. It is suggested that an approach be made to these bodies with a view to their assisting setting up training facilities in Kunar in due course.

4 PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

4.1 Schools:

4.1.1 There are a number of school buildings in the area. They were seen at Sarkhaneh, Chaghasarai and in Nengelam.

4.1.2 The school at Sarkhaneh, having a reinforced concrete frame, has been used variously as a billet for armed forces personnel and latterly as a stronghold. It was not possible to perform an engineering survey of the building, but the impression is that the frame will be suitable as a basis for rebuilding. New floors will be required, walls of brick will have to be built, a water supply --- possibly from a dug well --- will need to be constructed, and all equipment will need to be procured for there is not a board, table or chair anywhere.

4.1.3 A number of school buildings in Chaghasarai were visited.

The team was not able to enter the high school building. It is understood that it used to be for 400 - 500 secondary students. It is set in a garden adjacent to the hospital, and appears to be in reasonably sound condition. While some equipment was seen like steel chests and broken chairs, it is assumed that it will need to be entirely re-equipped. The size of the building gives the impression that the estimate of student body size might be a little optimistic.

The Vocational school (15 classrooms) which appears still in reasonable condition, but which will need maintenance. No equipment or facilities remain in the building.

A primary-cum-middle school for boys with 8 classrooms. With the exception of some infant chairs and tables (kindergarten), there appears to be no equipment available.

A middle school for girls, details of which were not recorded.

4.1.4 Two school buildings were seen in Nengelam --- or at least what was left of them. This village, at the confluence of the Pech and Waygal rivers, saw the first action in the present conflict, and the Taraki administration was said to have used the village as an example of the Government response to a challenge. In comparison with the bazaar area opposite which is described elsewhere in this report, it comes as some surprise that walls were left standing. Both schools, one for boys and one for girls, will require complete demolition and reconstruction.

4.2 Health Facilities:

4.2.1 The main hospital in Chaghasarai (36 rooms) was still standing, although it appears to have received some damage. From an engineering viewpoint, relatively little work will be required to restore the fabric of the building to adequate standards. It appears to have been used for billeting troops and as a first aid post during the latter hostilities. What little equipment remains is in total chaos, and will require complete re-equipping. There is space for up to 100 beds, a surgery, outpatients, an X-ray facility and the like. Naturally, this hospital will be the main referral hospital for the province.

4.2.2 The Basic Health Unit (BHU) at Sarkhaneh (12 rooms) was seen and, surprisingly, appears to be in a usable condition as far as the building is concerned. There were some 12 beds in the building which might be suitable for reuse, but all other equipment and facilities, even mattresses, will be required. This facility will need an independent water supply, probably from a dug well.

4.2.3 The BHU/Hospital at Nengelam which was in former times a remarkably solidly built building, has received a number of direct hits from high explosive. It should be entirely demolished and rebuilt. This is a key facility being in a somewhat remote area.

4.2.4 No other BHUs were seen but several must be assumed to have existed --- e.g., in Asmar, Chowki, etc.. The numbers of BHUs to be constructed or reconstructed and equipped will obviously depend on the availability of personnel, population and particularly distances in time. In terms of the service to health of the population, it makes sense to concentrate on re-equipping the hospital at Chaghasarai, and staffing it; and providing basic drugs for first aid to personnel (if any there be) at key positions in the province until the reconstruction process is sufficiently far advanced to contemplate reconstruction of BHUs.

4.3 Power:

4.3.1 Only the town of Chaghasarai and the timber mill at Salarbagh appear to have been electrified. Power was provided by two water driven turbines of 435 kVA each (from a weir on the Pech river); a 200 kVA diesel driven generator near the bridge over the Pech river in Chaghasarai; and a six cylinder diesel alternator of around 150 kVA at the timber mill.

4.3.2 Happily, the hydro-turbines appear to be in working condition which they were until October, 1988. Only some superficial damage has been effected to switchgear. Fuses have been removed, and wires torn out; but most of the basic equipment is still there. One of the transformers at the hydro station has a bullet hole through the cooling fins, but it would appear that minor restoration will see them operating satisfactorily. All equipment appears to have been of German origin, and it will require an expert to trace every circuit and order all missing parts. This process will inevitably be very slow, and it is thought that it will take around one year before power can effectively be restored to the area.

4.3.3 Again, the diesel alternator adjacent to the bridge over the Pech river has only suffered superficial damage; but will require an expert to check all circuits, order all missing parts and install them before power from this source can be restored. This generator set is of Czechoslovakian origin, the details of which were photographed.

4.3.4 There are, at the timber mill at Salarbagh, two generator sets. The larger, at 150 kVA and driven by a six cylinder diesel motor (possibly compressed air started), is installed in its own shed. Photographs indicate the destruction; but it is felt that relatively minor investment will be required to restore this set to working condition --- with considerable time of the expert in rewiring parts and ordering necessary spares. There is, in addition, a smaller, 4 cylinder diesel driven alternator lying outside the shed which is rated at 90 kVA, and which could provide additional power if it were to be installed. It has no associated switchgear. Both sets appear to be of Czechoslovakian origin. It is of interest to note that overhead cables (3-phase) run between the timber mill and the town of Chaghasarai. Whether this was for the mill to provide additional power to the town; or for the town supply to supplement the mill is unknown.

4.3.5 The distribution network in the town appears generally to be intact but will require considerable work to become functional. Wires have been cut (possibly from bullets or rockets), and are, in some places, lying on the ground. Most of the work can probably be undertaken by a competent linesman. However, it is noted that wiring is generally of a poor standard with many ad-hoc connections to the main feeder lines. It may be too ambitious to hope for a well regulated distribution network. In addition, pole transformers seem to have been used for target practice, and many will require to be replaced.

4.3.6 From the foregoing it would seem rational to suggest the need for the services of experts for the hydro-station and the generator sets; and a competent linesman. As the restoration of power does not seem to be of the highest priority, it is suggested that such personnel might delay their arrival until after main roads are fully functional, food supplies are established, houses are mostly rebuilt, and the mines swept.

4.3.7 It may not be out of place to note that at Managheh Tange in the Pech Valley between Chaghasarai and Nengelam, there is what appears to be an ideal site for a run-of-the-river hydro-power dam. The team was informed that a scheme was in hand in about 1978, and that surveys had been already undertaken by that date. The size would be around 20 cumecs through 50 metres depending on the use to which the power would be put. This is entirely relevant for if the irrigable area of the Kunar valley is to be expanded, power will be required to drive the pumps. Such a development will, of course, take a very low priority in the reconstruction phase; but should be noted for future development potential of the province.

4.4 Domestic Water Supplies:

4.4.1 In the parts of the province that were seen, domestic water supplies are not a problem. First, there is abundant good quality water from either rivers or springs well within reach of most inhabited areas; and, secondly, where facilities such as BHUs or schools will require water, the expedient of dug wells is well understood and well used locally. A number of examples were seen. The hospital may require an independent water supply, but the river is close and a small pump should suffice for water for most purposes. For clinical operations, boiling would, in any case, be required. It is noted that the team started with its own supply of safe water but very quickly discarded it, preferring to drink the clear sweet waters from springs and rivers. No infections resulted.

4.4.2 The team was unable to visit the southern part of the Kunar valley. As it is known that it widens considerably as it approaches Jalalabad, there may be some local domestic water supply problems in communities which are some distance from the river. Until the area can be visited, no further comment can be made.

4.5 Communications:

4.5.1 It is understood that there was a telephone system which operated in the area before the war, but it should be viewed as having been totally destroyed. Eventually, one will be required; but for the short term during the reconstruction phase of the work, it is proposed that the local administration be provided with solar or battery powered transceivers. The ability that the local administration has to coordinate activities in the valley will undoubtedly affect the speed and efficiency of the operation. Such radio sets should be sited in all the main centres of the province, at least in Chaghasarai, Khas Kunar, Asmar and Pech (Nengelam). Also, if stores are scattered, they will require to be equipped with similar radios --- although for the shorter distances, use can possibly be made of the simple walkie-talkies that appear to be readily available. Considerable distances can be reached with suitable external dipole aerials.

4.6 Timber Mill at Salarbagh:

4.6.1 Photographs show the wide variety of wood working equipment at this saw mill, which recently seems to have been producing coffins only. An expert will be required for some months to identify what equipment can be restored and used for production, but it is believed that relatively little damage has been sustained except to the generator switchgear. The wood-working machines appear to be in relatively good order.

4.6.2 As the saw mill is large, some fear must be expressed as the use to which it will be put. In another part of this report, the situation of the forests in the area is noted with considerable concern; and, unless very strict control is exercised in regulating both the supply of timber to the mill, and re-investment in planting of new trees to replace those harvested, this mill could be the cause of further deforestation. However, if the activities of the mill and the adjacent nursery are connected, this problem could be overcome.

4.7 General Administration:

4.7.1 No report on the area would be complete without noting the physical facilities available to the administration. Presently, the Shura is operating out of the former Governor's offices. While the building is essentially intact, facilities are very primitive. Chairs and sofas have seen no maintenance; desks and tables require attention, and windows, doors and frames are in considerable need of restoration. Bullet holes in plaster work --- the result of a fire-fight in the area --- need to be repaired.

4.7.2 No courts were seen in the area although there was undoubtedly some infrastructure to this end. However, in Nengelam, the Kasi's office was still standing above the wrecked hospital/BHU.

4.7.3 Should it be decided to strengthen the capacity and improve the effectiveness both of the Reconstruction Authority (RAFA), of the main Shura and of other authorities directly involved in the reconstruction of the Province, it is recommended that five Toyota pick-up trucks be made available to them.

The basis on which the Mission was invited into Kunar Province (see 5.2) ensured that it was welcome in Chaghasarai There, it was formally greeted by the Shura, 27 of whose 28 members, community and Mujahedeen leaders, were present at the meeting. The 28 members, who belong to 11 political parties, elect the Governor of the Province from their midst.

It is evident that a Mission lasting four days, visiting a very small part of the Province, can gain only a limited picture. This is particularly true of the political geography of the Province. Many Afghan, academic and NGO representatives have a much more detailed picture after years of experience in this field.

The Mission was aware that political and administrative arrangements, as with the agricultural and economic, in Kunar may be quite different to those to be found elsewhere. It would be wrong to extrapolate the findings of one short trip in one province to the whole or other parts of Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, it was highly significant that, in his address to the Mission, the Governor of the Province welcomed it primarily as a witness to the situation in Kunar and to the unity of the Mujahedeen. He said that this was more important than any help the Mission might be able to provide. The Afghans have achieved victory with God's help but otherwise on their own and could face the future likewise. He made it clear that the UN should consider the main Shura to be its partner in making arrangements for humanitarian assistance.

The Governor's remarks relating to the self-reliance of the Afghans may provide an insight into how the UN and its partners might approach relief and rehabilitation. The courage, resourcefulness and determination of the Afghans can be complemented by specific material inputs to formidable effect.

Roads are being de-mined by hand. Impressive quantities of goods, including seeds and fuel, are being transported over the Nawa Pass and up the Pech Valley by donkey and mule, and fields are being recultivated even in the absence of their owners and tenants. But all this is happening in conditions of great hardship and with loss of life. Much can and needs to be done to help.

The Mission strongly urges that a number of concrete, if modest, steps are immediately taken to facilitate the task facing the people in bringing Kunar back to normal.

ANNEX I

Composition of the Team

a) UN Inter-Agency Mission participants

Anthony Fitzherbert, FAO
Ken Gibbs, UNICEF
Michael Keating, UNOCA (UN Team Leader)
Peter Kouwenberg, UNDP
Bernard Quah, UNHCR
Dr. Levi Roque, WHO
Francesco Strippoli, WFP

b) Afghans

Engineer Mohammad Jan (Team Leader)
Engineer Hussain Ahmad
Abdul Qayoom (Mohibullah)

ANNEX II

Terms of reference

These were agreed with Dr Farooq Azam, Chairman of the Reconstruction Authority for Afghanistan, by Dr Martin Barber, Chief of Mission in Pakistan of the UN Co-ordinator's Office, prior to the Departure of the Mission:

1. Examine state of access roads and means of transportation and assess need for repair work

2. Assess the food needs of the existing population as well as the food requirements in the context of return home of refugees and displaced persons

3. Assess needs for agricultural rehabilitation including particularly irrigation systems

4. Assess fuel needs for work in various sectors

5. Examine location and capacity of storage facilities

6. Assess the problems of mines

7. Assess health needs of the population, including in particular women and children

8. Assess needs for reconstruction materials, both for housing and communal buildings

9. Assess education needs

10. Assess opportunities for potential of cottage industries

ANNEX III

Mission Timing and Route

The Mission was inside Afghanistan for almost exactly 100 hours. Times below are local (Afghanistan is half an hour ahead of Pakistan).

Friday 9th

0900	Briefing of UNOCA by Dr Farooq Azam
1800	Martin Barber briefed UN participants on Mission

Saturday 10th

1300	Departed Peshawar in UN vehicles; spent night in Khar

Sunday 11th

0950	Arrived Nawa Pass; trip in pick-up to mine field
1200	Arrived Sarkhaneh on foot
1515	Arrived Commander Salim's camp, Nowabad; stayed night

Monday 12th

0730	Inspected Saw Mill, canal, arriving by vehicle
0815	Arrived Chaghasarai (Asadabad)
0900	Meeting with Governor of Kunar
1000	Meeting with Shura, Chaghasarai
1430	Depart for Asmar by jeep after tour of Chaghasarai
1700	Jeep breaks down; 17 km walk to Chaghasarai
2200	Arrive Chaghasarai

Tuesday 13th

0830	Depart for Watapur by truck
0930	Set off on foot for Pech/Nengelam - 28 km walk
1730	Arrive Nengelam; spend night

Wednesday 14th


0730	Set off by foot up Pech Valley
0930	Inspection of devastated town; begin trek back down
1600	Arrive Watapur after 30 km walk; met by jeep
1730	Arrive Chaghasarai

Thursday 15th

0730	Breakfast with Governor
0900	Depart by jeep for Sarkhaneh
1000	Arrive Sarkhaneh; set off on foot for Nawa Pass
1215	Met by pick-up and driven to border
1300	Arrive Pakistan
1930	Arrive Peshawar

Friday 16th

0915	Debriefing by team with Reconstruction Authority



Rivers

Roads/tracks
(many others not shown)

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE MISSIONS

1 The number of participants on Salam missions should not exceed four or five. Greater numbers increase logistical and transportaion problems. They also necessitate greater hospitality from Afghan hosts who, it goes without saying, would nevertheless provide it without hesitation for even larger numbers.

2 The specific experience of Salam 5, which had seven members, was that long-term development needs could have been covered by suitably briefed participants from the relief-oriented agencies and by the Co-ordinator's Office.

3 Careful consideration needs to be given prior to any Salam mission departure as to whether its objectives could be best served by walking, riding or motoring through the relevant area. If the first or second, then the physical fitness of members must be one of the primary factors in identifying participants

4 The nationality of participants is important. Salam 5 members were always asked their nationality before almost anything else. They were led to believe that colleagues from CMEA countries or from India might face problems.

5 Language proficiency in Pashto or Dari by at least one participant is an invaluable asset. The Afghans appreciate it and it helps in gaining an accurate and warm-blooded picture of conditions.

6 Good maps can enormously facilitate the work - for example, in identifying land use and the prevalence of mines. Ideally, high scale maps should be found and disrtributed by the Co-ordinator's Office to members prior to departure.

Afghans tend not to be intimidated by time and schedules. Where possible, missions should be similarly free. Logistical problems and the element of chance could make tight schedules unnecessarily restrictive

8 If, as with Salam 5, the mission intends to rely upon local transport, a wide margin should be allowed for timing. Transportation and fuel can be very scarce.

9 Participants would be advised to take Dictaphones. There is often little time or light in which to write things down.

10 In retrospect, a record prior to departure of the expectations of the Mission in the area to which it was going would have been useful and instructive.

11 More than one radio frequency should be arranged for contact with home base. At one stage, the single frequency arranged for Salam 5 was jammed. Fortunately, this proved to be temporary. It might not always be so.

12 If the mission intends to split up, walkie-talkies would prove useful.

13 Some thought needs to be given to co-ordination of photography. High speed film, e.g. ASA 400, is useful both for indoor shots and in dull weather.

ANNEX IV

Selected Further Reading

1 Forest Management Plan for the Diwagal Forest; Assistance to Forestry and Watershed Development (FO: DP/AFG/79/009; Field Document 2 (FAO/UNDP), Kabul, 1979)

2 Irrigation Development in Kunar Region (Project Proposal, Ministry of Agriculture)

3 Forest Management and Utilistaion in the Kunar and Paktia Provinces (Project Proposal, Dept. of F & R, Min. of Agriculture and Land Reform)

4 Project on Irrigation Development in Kunar Region (FAO/Govt. Co-operative Programme Plan of Operation, Min. of Agriculture)

5 Wood Utilisation Development and Demonstration (TCP/AFG/8802, FAO Library. Terminal Statement - FAO Rome, 1980)

6 Kunar Forestry Development Demonstration Afghanistan. Establishment of Forest Nurseries and Pilot Plantations in Kunar (FO: DP/AFG/77/001. Field Document No.1, Min. of Agriculture/FAO, Asadabad, 1977)

7. Design Study of Various Alternatives for Kunar Hydro-Power Project Upstream of the Highway Bridge Across the Pech River at Asadabad (Local Afghanistan Report, AGLW Document, FAO Kabul, April 1975)

8 Kunar Forest and Sawmilling Development Afghanistan. A Proposal for a Sawmilling Industry in the Kunar Region (FO: DP/AFG/74/004. Field Document, Min. of Agriculture/FAO 821 8027. Asadabad, March 1977)

9 Kunar Wood Utilisation and Demonstration Afghanistan and Evaluation of the Sawmilling Industry in Kabul Area (TCP/AFG/8802. Technical Report (FAO) 821 8037. Kabul 1980)

10 Kunar Wood Utilisation Development and Demonstration (TCP/AFG/8802.

Terminal Statement (FAO) 800 6289 Rome 1980)

11 An Evaluation Mission to the Panjshir Valley (FAO OIC Office, July 1988)

12 First Consolidated Report (UNOCA/1988/1, Geneva, Septemeber 1988)

13 Preliminary Report on Conditions Affecting the Repatriation of Afghan Refugees (UNHCR, Geneva 20th June 1988, prepared by Richard English)

2.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Kunar has suffered great destruction. The needs are enormous. Preparations for peace have barely begun. It may be both premature and unnecessary to identify long-term operational partners at this early stage when the bulk of the population is Mujahedeen. But the willingness of the Reconstruction Authority for Afghanistan to work with the Provincial Shura in Chaghasarai in receiving international assistance provides a basis on which to begin.

The UN should be aware that its decision to begin operations and work with a particular body within Kunar will undoubtedly change that body's status both among Afghans in the Province and elsewhere.

We recommend that a number of concrete, if modest, steps be immediately taken to facilitate the effort already being made in conditions of great hardship by the remaining population to bring normal life back to the Province:

2.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

Each of the sectorial reports includes a number of recommendations, both short and longer term. The following is a list of recommendations for action which could be taken in the near future. The Mission urges that the first five points are undertaken immediately.

The situation in Kunar is sure to change as refugees return. For the moment the mission recommends that the Reconstruction Authority for Afghanistan, particularly once it has opened an office in Chaghasarai, be considered and tested as the United Nations local implementing partner, an arrangement which should be guided by the advice of the Main Shura.

1 Provision of tools and equipment including a bulldozer, a grader, four 3-tonne dumpers, and five tractors, to expedite road clearance, including the de-mining of roads (see sections 3.1.3; 3.2.2).

2 Rehabilitation of the 500 - 600 tonne capacity storage depot and its outbuildings including the petrol station, in Chaghasarai (3.4.3; 3.5.4).

3 The provision of summer crop seeds, fertilizer and agricultural implements for distribution from Chaghasarai (3.6.8).

4 Tools for the repair of traditional irrigation channels (3.6.8 f).

5 Encourage the preparation by the Reconstruction Authority for Afghanistan of a detailed map of the location of mines (3.1.3).

6 Provision of an initially limited number of steel girders for house construction as a pilot project as well as basic construction tools which would be controlled by the Shura (3.3.6 d & e).

7 Delivery of 400 tonnes of food for distribution to returnees, from Chaghasarai (3.4.5).

8 Provision of a limited number of tents for returnees (3.3.6).

9 Provision of three tractors with implements and fuel for breaking up land that has fallen into disuse through neglect (3.6.8 d).

10 Repair of the saw mill and nursery beside it as the first step in what should become an integrated reafforestation project (3.6.8 g; 4.6).

There is scope for many other pressing recommendations in areas such as health (3.7.5), education (3.8.3), power (4.3), communications (4.5) etc., but the Mission considers that the above to be the appropriate first steps. They are all immediately implementable.

3.1.1 Security and Ordnance

Forces allied to the Kabul government left Kunar Province in early October. Since then, there have been a number of limited air strikes against Chaghasarai but the Mission heard of no activity during December. During the trip, two aircraft appeared momentarily at high altitude above the hills to the west of Chaghasarai. They were met by anti-aircraft fire from the Mujahedeen in the surrounding hills.

Lack of air power makes Kunar, like other areas controlled by the Mujahedeen, vulnerable to attack. Access roads, in particular the main road running from Asmar in the north down through Chaghasarai, Chowki and on to Jalalabad, are heavily defended. Strategic positions in the hills beside the roads and around settlements are manned by Mujahedeen

Nearly everybody encountered was armed. There is a great variety of weapons, including pistols, rifles, machine guns and rocket propelled grenades. The Mission also saw anti-aircraft guns and a variety of other weapons captured from or abandoned by enemy forces. The Mujahedeen take pride in demonstrating their shooting skills and volleys could frequently be heard in the valleys.

The Mission saw at least 100 abandoned tanks and Armoured Personnel Carriers in the limited area visited. Other military vehicles including trucks and jeeps are liberally abandoned. Many of their parts have been removed for scrap. There are bomb craters, some 2 metres deep and 5 metres across, along many roads. There are also large quantities of shells, ammunition boxes and other military equipment lying around, mostly along access roads and tracks.

3.1.2 Mines

The Mission repeatedly heard of people recently killed or maimed by mines. No figures were available. The wounded are either taken for treatment to Pakistan or removed to safety in the hills. There were few amputees in evidence. Unlike many of the other problems in Kunar, the mine issue leaves the Mujahedeen at a loss as to how to act. The challenge is how to find rather than detonate them.

The following information was gathered entirely from discussions with Mujahedeen in the Kunar.

No-one knows where the mines have been placed; if the Russians had plans, the mission was advised that they did not share them even with Kabul regime forces, as captured Afghans from the Kabul side have confirmed. Nor have Mujahedeen groups kept each other informed of where the mines they have laid are located.

There are at least six types of mines in the areas visited:

a) Pressure mines. These are hand-laid, round, largely plastic mines which can remain active for many years. They are detonated when stepped upon. They are laid under the surface of the ground and can kill. Originally laid by the enemy, the Mujahedeen have re-laid those which they have found around enemy positions.

b) Anti-pressure mines. Also hand-laid, round, hidden and largely plastic, with a long life and able to kill. They are detonated when weight is removed from above them. As with pressure mines, they have also been re-laid by Mujahedeen who detonate them by shooting at them or by driving their goats and cattle across the fields.

c) Trip mines ('grenades on sticks'). These are hand-laid and are activated by a trip wire. The wire is difficult to spot and the explosive part hidden in scrub. They are also said to remain active for years and can kill people. The Mujahedeen detonate them by shooting at them and by burning the scrub.

d) 'Electrical' mines. These are said to be extremely sensitive, battery-powered, hand-laid and with a life of up to one year. They can also kill their victims. The Mujahedeen were not unanimous as to how they are activated - possibly seismically.

e) 'Bird' mines (butterfly mines). These have two 'wings' with the detonator in the spine dividing them. They have been dropped by helicopter and are most common on hillsides. Contact with them activates them; they maim. The Mujahedeen detonate them by throwing stones or shooting at them.

f) Anti-vehicle mines. These have been laid by the Mujahedeen along roads which were used by enemy forces. They were obtained either in Pakistan or captured from enemy stores. The Mission saw a road construction team at work on the road below the Nawa pass, removing these mines by hand.

Soviet and government forces were said to have been laying mines for the last six or seven years. The Mujahedeen began more recently. The basic pattern is that the hills around population centres once controlled by enemy forces are mined with types a) to f), as are areas immediately around ex-enemy outposts high up in the hills. With the exception of the area around Chaghasarai, along the main road southwards as far as Nowabad, and the Pech Valley, agricultural land is liberally mined. The fields on the north side of the road from Chaghasarai up to Asmar and along the valley bottom around Chowki and Nurgal are said also to be heavily mined.

3.1.3 Recommendations

The Reconstruction Authority for Afghanistan in Peshawar sent a team to Kunar around December 18th to map areas where mines are prevalent. If possible, this information should be shared with the de-mining experts being assembled by the Co-ordinator's Office in Islamabad with a view to developing a de-mining strategy for Kunar. Returnees will have to be alerted to the dangers posed by mines.

Suitable de-mining equipment should be made available to the teams clearing the roads. Experts need to determine what equipment - for example, flails or mine-detectors - would be most suitable.

The possibility of mobilising large numbers of Mujahedeen (and later, civilians) to detect mines in key agricultural areas by use of 'prodders' needs to be explored. Each field would need to be painstakingly swept by groups of individuals working together. This has proved one of the most effective, if time- and labour-intensive, methods of ensuring that an area is cleared and that the population can be confident of its safety.

3.2 Access Routes and Logistics

3.2.1 Roads

The usual access to Kunar Province from Peshawar is the route Peshawar-Landi Kotal-Torkham-Jalalabad-Chaghasarai. The road along this route is tarmac up to Nurgal, 50 km before Chaghasarai Due to the war, use of this route is not feasible. The only alternative at present is through the Nawa Pass which is reached from Peshawar through the Mohamand Agency or through the Malakand Pass, Dir District and Khar (Bajaur Agency).

According to information gathered, vehicles up to a maximum capacity of 3 tonnes can negotiate the Nawa Pass. Road repairs have already been carried out by the Mujahedeen on the first eight kilometres from the border, and commercial transport is already using this stretch of road. At this point, there is a mine field of approximately 2 - 3 km, and the Mission, on its return trip to Pakistan, witnessed the Mujahedeen clearing the road of anti-tank mines, and was informed that ten days later the road would be passable to commercial vehicles. The Mission also saw an old grader being used to open a new road to circumvent another mine field further down.

The road from Sarkhaneh to Chaghasarai can presently be used with difficulty only by four wheel drive vehicles. A substantial amount of work needs to be carried out on this stretch as it will be needed for commercial vehicles. The bridge crossing the Kunar river at Nowabad has not been damaged. The road from Sarkhaneh-Peshed-Khas Kunar (approx 12 km) cannot be used because of anti-tank mines. The road Chaghasarai (±15 km) -Chowki (±25 km) -Nurgal (±? km) was only partially seen by the Mission and, as stated above, this stretch requires considerable work. The Mission was told that the stretch Nowabad-Nurgal also is in a similar condition.

The road from Chaghasarai to Asmar (±25 km) is only accessible with extreme difficulty to four wheel drive vehicles. The bridge crossing the Pech river in Chaghasarai is in good condition, but another two bridges towards Asmar have been destroyed. Along this road, many stream beds have to be crossed making it very difficult to reach Asmar even with a four wheel drive vehicle.

The Mission only travelled some 20 km towards Asmar and thus was unable to see Naray (30 km from Asmar), Kamdesh (25 km from Naray), and Bergey Matal. The Mission understood that Naray, Kamdesh and Bergey Matal can only be reached on foot. The road going west-north-west of Chaghasarai towards Nengelam up the Pech valley, some 35 km long, may be used by a four wheel drive vehicle up to Watapur village (±12 km). The remaining stretch may presently only be passed on foot. The former road in this portion no longer exists in places both along the hillsides as well as where the many streams cross the road. Major works need to be undertaken to restore this road so it is usable by commercial vehicles. It should be noted that anti-tank mines may still be present on this road.

From Nengelam village the road linking it to Chapa Dora is said to be in much the same condition. It is 15 km long. A notable volume of people and donkeys carrying a range of items was seen on the Nawa Pass-Chaghasarai-Nengelam road.

3.2.2 Requirements for road repair

In order to rehabilitate and repair the road network of Kunar Province the provision of the following is deemed to be necessary:

1) Machinery including a bulldozer, grader, four three tonne dumpers, five tractors (with trailers, dozer blades, and spike harrows), four jack hammers (paving breakers);

2) 300 tonnes of cement, and wire mesh for constructing gabions;

3) Tools for all machinery and equipment; and

4) Fuel to keep the equipment running.

These items should be urgently considered by the United Nations. It would perhaps be necessary for the services of a road engineer to be made available for supporting these inputs, and to monitor the utilisation of the U.N. provided assistance.

3.3.3 Fuel

There was no fuel to be found at any of the sites visited by the Mission. The very limited quantity of fuel available has been transported into the valley by donkey. The situation will improve with the opening of the Nawa Pass road but fuel will continue to be a scarce commodity for a considerable time to come. It is therefore suggested that the U.N. utilise for its own needs the petrol station at Chaghasarai which is located in the storage facilities that the U.N. should take over as recommended elsewhere in this report.

3.3 <u>Housing and Shelter</u> - Immediate needs

3.3.1 The devastation caused by the war varies widely in Kunar Province. Visits were paid to Chaghasarai (formerly Asadabad), Sarkhaneh, Nowabad, part of the area leading to Asmar and the district of Pech. Almost all the places visited were badly bombed. The most affected areas were Sarkhaneh and Nengelam (Pech) where some 95% of the two villages were flattened to the ground. With the exception of a few concrete buildings which can still be repaired, each entire village has to be rebuilt.

3.3.2 Only a small fraction of the civilian population remains, concentrated along the banks of the Pech river. War still hangs in the air. Most of the people who have returned to the province in the last two months are still living under the air raid shelters below their destructed homes.

3.3.3 The buildings here are mainly of <u>katcha</u> construction which is of the same type used by refugees now living in Pakistan. Almost all the construction materials such as stone, mud, straw, and wooden beams for making homes are available locally, but should the refugees return to their homeland in significant numbers, the forests in the area risk being cut down rapidly to meet the demand for wood - for windows, doors and roofs. Alternatives should be explored as soon as possible to protect the very few acres of forest still remaining.




SALAM 5

100 HOURS IN KUNAR

10 - 15 December 1988

OPERATION SALAM

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One Hundred Hours in Kunar

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